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 The last 50 years have witnessed a dazzling array of social ethical revolutions 
in Western society.  Such moral movements as feminism, civil rights, environmentalism, 
affirmative action, consumer advocacy, pro- and anti-abortion activism, homosexual rights, 
children‘s rights, the student movement, antiwar activism, public rejection of biotechnology, 
have forever changed the way governments and pubic institutions comport themselves.  This 
is equally true for private enterprise:  to be successful, businesses must be seen as operating 
solidly in harmony with changing and emerging social ethics.  It is arguable that morally 
based boycotting of South African business was instrumental in bringing about the end of 
apartheid, and similar boycotting of some farm products in the U.S. led to significant 
improvements in the living situations of farm workers.  It is de rigeur for major corporations 
to have reasonable numbers of minorities visibly peopling their ranks, and for liquor 
companies to advertise on behalf of moderation in alcohol consumption.  Cigarette 
companies now press upon the public a message that cigarettes kill, and extol their 
involvement in protecting battered women; and forestry and oil companies spend millions 
(even billions) to persuade the public of their environmental commitments.   
 Not only is success tied to accord with social ethics but, even more fundamentally, 
freedom and autonomy are as well.  Every profession – be it medicine, law or agriculture – is 
given freedom by the social ethic to pursue its aims.  In return, society basically says to 
professions it does not understand well enough to regulate, ―you regulate yourselves the way 
we would regulate you if we understood what you do, which we don‘t.  But we will know if 
you don‘t self-regulate properly and then we will regulate you, despite our lack of 
understanding.‖  For example, some years ago, Congress became concerned about excessive 
use of antibiotic in animal feeds, and concluded that veterinarians were a major source of the 
problem.  As a result, Congress was about to ban extra-label drug use by veterinarians, a 
move that would have killed veterinary medicine as we know it.  However, through extensive 
efforts to educate legislators, such legislation did not proceed to law. 
  One major social ethical concern that has developed over the last four decades is a 
significant emphasis on the treatment of animals used by society for various purposes.  It is 
easy to demonstrate the degree to which these concerns have seized the public imagination.  
According to both the U.S. National Cattlemen‘s Beef Association and the National Institutes 
of Health (the latter being the source of funding for the majority of biomedical research in the 
U.S.), both groups not inclined to exaggerate the influence of animal ethics, by the early 
1990s Congress had been consistently receiving more letters, phone calls, faxes, e-mails and 
personal contacts on animal-related issues than on any other topic ( McCarthy, 1988; NCBA, 
1992).   
 Whereas 30 years ago one would have found no bills pending in the U.S. Congress 
relating to animal welfare, recent years have witnessed dozens of such bills annually, with 
2100  in 2004 at the state level.  State laws  have increasingly prevented the use of live or 
dead shelter animals for biomedical research and training and have focused on myriad other 
areas of animal welfare.   Seventy percent of Colorado‘s population voted to end the spring 
bear hunt by constitutional amendment (Denver Post, 1994).   In Ontario, the environmental 
minister stopped a similar hunt by executive fiat in response to social ethical concern 
(Animal People, 1999).  California abolished the hunting of mountain lions. 
 In fact, wildlife managers have worried, in academic journals, about ―management by 
referendum‖  for humane reasons. According to the director of the American Quarter Horse 
Association, the number of state bills related to horse welfare filled a telephone-book-sized 
volume in 1998 alone (Houston, 1998).  Public sentiment for equine welfare in California 
carried a bill through the state legislature making the slaughter of horses or shipping of 
horses for slaughter a felony in that state and the end of horse slaughter in the U.S. followed.   
 Even more dramatic, perhaps, is the worldwide proliferation of laws to protect 
laboratory animals.  In the United States, for example, two major pieces of legislation, which 
I helped draft and defend before Congress, regulating and constraining the use and treatment 
of animals in research were passed by the U.S. Congress in 1985, despite vigorous opposition 
from the powerful biomedical research and medical lobbies (Animal Welfare Act; Health 
Research Extension Act).  This opposition included well-financed, highly visible 
advertisements and media promotions indicating that human health and medical progress 
would be harmed by implementation of such legislation.  When I testified before Congress 
on behalf of this law in 1982, a literature search in the Library of Congress turned up no 
papers in the scientific literature on laboratory animal analgesia and only two on animal 
analgesia, one of which said "there ought to be papers." Now my anesthesiology colleagues 
tell me there are between 5 and 10 thousand, with a commensurate increase in use.  Equally 
important, these laws have undercut scientific ideology‘s unwillingness to acknowledge 
animal thought and feeling (Rollin, 2006).   
In 1986, Britain superseded its pioneering act of 1876 with new laws aimed at 
strengthening public confidence in the welfare of experimental animals (Animal Legislation, 
2003).   Research on Great Apes has been truncated across the world.   
 Many animal uses seen as frivolous by the public have been abolished without 
legislation.  Toxicological testing of cosmetics on animals has been truncated; companies 
such as the Body Shop have been wildly successful internationally by totally disavowing 
such testing, and free-range egg production is a growth industry across the Western world.  
Greyhound racing in the U.S. has declined, in part for animal welfare reasons, with the 
Indiana veterinary community spearheading the effort to prevent greyhound racing from 
coming into the state.  Zoos that are little more than prisons for animals (the state of the art 
 during my youth) have all but disappeared, and the very existence of zoos is being 
increasingly challenged, despite the public‘s unabashed love of seeing animals.  And, as 
Gaskell and his associates‘ work has revealed (Gaskell, et al., 1997), genetic engineering has 
been rejected in Europe not, as commonly believed, for reasons of risk but for reasons of 
ethics; in part for reasons of animal ethics.  Similar reasons (i.e., fear of harming cattle) have, 
in part, driven European rejection of bovine somatotropin (BST).   
Inevitably, agriculture has felt the force of social concern with animal treatment – 
indeed, it is arguable that contemporary concern in society with the treatment of farm 
animals in modern production systems blazed the trail leading to a new ethic for animals. As 
early as 1965, British society took notice of what the public saw as an alarming tendency to 
industrialize animal agriculture by chartering the Brambell Commission, a group of scientists 
under the leadership of Sir Rogers Brambell, who affirmed that any agricultural system 
failing to meet the needs and natures of animals was morally unacceptable (Brambell,1965).   
In 1988, the Swedish Parliament passed, virtually unopposed, what the New York Times 
called a ―Bill of Rights‖ for farm animals, abolishing in Sweden, in a series of timed steps, 
the confinement systems currently dominating North American agriculture (New York 
Times, 1988).  Much of northern Europe has followed suit, and the European Union is 
moving in a similar direction, and sow stalls must be eliminated in by 2011 (EU, 2001).   
Although the U.S. has been a latecomer to agricultural issues, things have moved 
rapidly, with referenda pressed by HSUS abolishing sow stalls, battery cages, and veal crates 
across the U.S. My own work attests to this tendency. In 2007, over two days of dialogue, I 
convinced Smithfield Farms, the world's largest pork producer, to phase out gestation crates. 
In 2008, the Pew Commission, on which I served as the advocate for farm animal welfare, 
called for the end of high confinement animal agriculture within ten years, for reasons of 
animal welfare, environmental despoliation, human and animal health, and social justice. 
Most dramatically, I was able to broker an agreement between the Humane Society of the 
United States and the Colorado Livestock Association passing a jointly sponsored farm 
animal welfare law in Colorado in 2008, abolishing sow stalls and veal crates. 
The agriculture community in the U.S. has been far behind societal concern. There is 
one monumental conceptual error that is omnipresent in the agricultural industry‘s 
discussions of animal welfare – an error of such magnitude that it trivializes the industry‘s 
responses to ever-increasing societal concerns about the treatment of agricultural animals.  
When one discusses farm animal welfare with industry groups or with the American 
Veterinary Medical Association, one finds the same response – animal welfare is solely a 
matter of ―sound science‖. 
 Those of us serving on the Pew Commission, better known as the National 
Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, encountered this response regularly 
during our dealings with industry representatives.  This commission studied intensive animal 
agriculture in the U.S. (Pew Trusts, 2008; pcifap.org). For example, one representative of the 
Pork Producers, testifying before the Commission, answered that while people in her industry 
were quite ―nervous‖ about the Commission, their anxiety would be allayed were we to base 
all of our conclusions and recommendations on ―sound science‖.  Hoping to rectify the error 
in that comment, as well as educate the numerous industry representatives present, I 
responded to her as follows:  ―Madame, if we on the Commission were asking the question 
of how to raise swine in confinement, science could certainly answer that question for us.  
But that is not the question the Commission, or society, is asking.  What we are asking is, 
 ought we raise swine in confinement?  And to this question, science is not relevant‖.  Judging 
by her ―huh‖, I assume I did not make my point. 
 Questions of animal welfare are at least partly ―ought‖ questions, questions of ethical 
obligation.  The concept of animal welfare is an ethical concept to which, once understood, 
science brings relevant data.  When we ask about an animal‘s welfare, or about a person‘s 
welfare, we are asking about what we owe the animal, and to what extent.  When a document 
called the CAST report, first published by U.S. Agricultural scientists in the early 1980‘s, 
discussed animal welfare, it affirmed that the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
attributing positive welfare to an animal were represented by the animals‘ productivity.  A 
productive animal enjoyed positive welfare; a non-productive animal enjoyed poor welfare 
(CAST, 1981). 
 This notion was fraught with many difficulties.  First of all, productivity is an 
economic notion predicated of a whole operation; welfare is predicated of individual animals.  
An operation, such as caged laying hens may be quite profitable if the cages are severely 
over crowded yet the individual hens do not enjoy good welfare.  Second,  equating 
productivity and welfare is, to some significant extent, legitimate under husbandry 
conditions, where the producer does well if and only if the animals do well, and square pegs, 
as it were, are fitted into square holes with as little friction as possible (as when pigs live 
outside).  Under industrial conditions, however, animals do not naturally fit in the niche or 
environment in which they are kept, and are subjected to ―technological sanders‖ that allow 
for producers to force square pegs into round holes – antibiotics, feed additives, hormones, 
air handling systems – so the animals do not die and produce more and more kilograms of 
meat or milk.  Without these technologies, the animals could not be productive.   
 The key point to recall here is that even if the CAST Report definition of animal 
welfare did not suffer from the difficulties we outlined, it is still an ethical concept.  It 
essentially says ―what we owe animals and to what extent is simply what it takes to get them 
to create profit‖.  This in turn would imply that the animals are well-off if they have only 
food, water, and shelter, something the industry has sometimes asserted.  Even in the early 
80‘s, however, there were animal advocates and others who would take a very different 
ethical stance on what we owe farm animals.  Indeed, the famous five freedoms articulated in 
Britain by the Farm Animal Welfare Council during the 1970‘s (even before the CAST 
Report) represents quite a different ethical view of what we owe animals, when it affirms 
that:  
The welfare of an animal includes its physical and mental state and we 
consider that good animal welfare implies both fitness and a sense of well-
being.  Any animal kept by man, must at least, be protected from unnecessary 
suffering. 
We believe that an animal‘s welfare, whether on farm, in transit, at market or 
at a place of slaughter should be considered in terms of ‘five freedoms’ (see 
www.fawc.org.uk). 
1. Freedom from Hunger and Thirst   
2. Freedom from Discomfort  
3. Freedom from Pain, Injury or Disease  
4. Freedom to Express Normal Behavior  
5. Freedom from Fear and Distress  
 Clearly there is an indefinite number of other definitions).  Which is correct, of 
course, cannot be decided by gathering facts or doing experiments – indeed which ethical 
framework one adopts will in fact determine the shape of science studying animal welfare. 
 To clarify: suppose you hold the view that an animal is well-off when it is productive, 
as per the CAST Report.  The role of your welfare science in this case will be to study what 
feed, bedding, temperature, etc. are most efficient at producing the most meat, milk, or eggs 
for the least money – much what animal and veterinary science does today.  On the other 
hand, if you take the FAWC view of welfare, your efficiency will be constrained by the need 
to acknowledge the animal‘s natural behavior and mental state, and to assure that there is 
minimal pain, fear, distress and discomfort – not factors in the CAST view of welfare unless 
they have a negative impact on economic productivity.  Thus, in a real sense, sound science 
does not determine your concept of welfare; rather, your concept of welfare determines what 
counts as sound science! 
 The failure to recognize the inescapable ethical component in the concept of animal 
welfare leads inexorably to those holding different ethical views talking past each other.  
Thus, producers ignore questions of animal suffering not affecting production.  Animal 
advocates, on the other hand, give such factors primacy, and are totally unimpressed with 
how efficient or productive the system may be. 
A major question obviously arises here.  If the notion of animal welfare is inseparable 
from ethical components, and people‘s ethical stance on obligations to farm animals differ 
markedly across a highly diverse spectrum, whose ethic is to predominate and define, in law 
or regulation, what counts as ―animal welfare‖? It is to this issue we now turn. 
What is the nature of the emerging new ethical thinking that underlies and informs the 
dramatic social changes just discussed?  Although society has always had an articulated ethic 
regarding animal treatment, that ethic has been very minimalistic, leaving most of the issue 
of animal treatment to people‘s personal ethic, rather than to the social ethic.  Since Biblical 
times, that limited social ethic has forbidden deliberate, willful, sadistic, deviant, purposeless, 
unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering on animals, or outrageous neglect, such as not 
feeding or watering.  Beginning in the early nineteenth century, this set of prohibitions was 
articulated in the anti-cruelty statutes of the laws in all civilized societies (Leavitt, 1978).  
But even in Biblical and medieval times, the social ethic inveighed against cruelty.  The Old 
Testament injunctions against yoking an ox and an ass together to a plow, or muzzling the ox 
when it is being used to mill grain, or seething a calf in its mother‘s milk, all reflect concern 
with, and abhorrence for what the Rabbinical tradition called tsaar baalei chaiim; the 
suffering of living things.  In the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas, 1956), while 
affirming that, lacking a soul, animals enjoyed no moral status, nonetheless strictly forbade 
cruelty, on the grounds that permitting such behavior towards animals would encourage its 
spreading to human beings, an insight buttressed by over two decades of recent research 
(Ascione, e. al., 1999).  Numerous serial killers have evidenced early abusive behavior 
towards animals, as have many of the youths in the U.S. who in recent years wrought 
massacres on their peers. 
For the overwhelming majority of human history, until some four decades ago, the 
anti-cruelty ethic served as the only socially articulated moral principle for animal treatment.  
Except for a few sporadic voices following in the wake of Darwin‘s articulation of human-
animal continuity, no one spoke of animals‘ rights, nor did society have moral concepts for 
animal treatment that went ―beyond cruelty.‖  The obvious question that presents itself is 
this:  What has occurred during the last half century which led to social disaffection with the 
 venerable ethic of anti-cruelty and to strengthening of the anti-cruelty laws, which now make 
cruelty a felony in almost 40 states. 
In a study commissioned by USDA to answer this question, I distinguished a variety 
of social and conceptual reasons (Rollin, 1995): 
1) Changing demographics and consequent changes in the paradigm for animals: 
 Whereas at the turn of the century, more than half the population was engaged in 
producing food for the rest, today only some 1.5% of the U.S. public is engaged in 
production agriculture (AMC, 2003).  One hundred years ago, if one were to ask a person in 
the street, urban or rural, to state the words that come into their mind when one says 
―animal‖, the answer would doubtless have been ―horse‖, ―cow‖, ―food‖, ―work‖, etc.  
Today, however, for the majority of the population, the answer is ―dog‖, ―cat‖, ―pet‖.  
2)  We have lived through a long period of ethical soul-searching 
 For almost 50 years society has turned its ―ethical searchlight‖ on humans 
traditionally ignored or even oppressed by the consensus ethic – blacks, women, the 
handicapped, other minorities.  The same ethical imperative has focused attention on our 
treatment of the non-human world – the environment and animals.  
3)  The media has discovered that ―animals sell papers‖ 
 One cannot channel-surf across normal television service without being bombarded 
with animal stories, real and fictional.  (A New York Times reporter recently told me that 
more time on cable TV in New York City is devoted to animals than to any other subject.)  
Recall, for example, the extensive media coverage a decade ago of some whales trapped in 
an ice-floe, and freed by a Russian ice-breaker.  This was hardly an overflowing of Russian 
compassion – an oxymoronic notion applied to a people who gave us pogroms, the Gulag, 
and Stalinism.  Rather, someone in the Kremlin was bright enough to realize that liberating 
the whales was an extremely cheap way to score points with U.S. public opinion. 
4)  Strong and visible arguments have been advanced in favor of raising the status of animals 
by philosophers, scientists and celebrities  (Singer, 1975; Rollin, 1981; Regan, 1983; 
Sapontzis, 1987). 
5)  Changes in the nature of animal use demanded new moral categories 
 In my view, while all of the reasons listed above are relevant, they are nowhere nearly 
as important as the precipitous and dramatic changes in animal use that occurred after World 
War II.  These changes were, first of all, huge conceptual changes in the nature of agriculture 
and second the rise of significant amounts of animal research and testing. 
For virtually all of human history, animal agriculture was based foursquare in animal 
husbandry.  Husbandry, derived from the old Norse word ―hus/band,‖ bonded to the 
household, meant taking great pains to put one‘s animals into the best possible environment 
one could find to meet their physical and psychological natures which, following Aristotle, I 
call telos(Rollin, 1992), and then augmenting their ability to survive and thrive by providing 
them with food during famine, protection from predation, water during drought, medical 
attention, help in birthing, and so on.  Thus traditional agriculture was roughly a fair contract 
between humans and animals, with both sides being better off in virtue of the relationship.  
Husbandry agriculture was about putting square pegs into square holes, round pegs into 
round holes, and creating as little friction as possible doing so.  So powerful is the notion of 
husbandry, in fact, that when the Psalmist seeks a metaphor for God‘s ideal relationship to 
humans, he seizes upon the shepherd in the 23
rd
 Psalm: 
The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want; He maketh me to lie down in green 
pastures; He leadeth me beside still waters; He restoreth my soul.   
   
We wish no more from God than what the husbandman provides for his sheep.  In husbandry, 
a producer did well if and only if the animals did well, so productivity was tied to welfare.   
No social ethic was thus needed to ensure proper animal treatment; only the anti-cruelty 
designed to deal with sadists and psychopaths was needed to augment husbandry.  Self-
interest virtually assured good treatment. 
 After World War II, this beautiful contract was broken by humans.  Symbolically, at 
universities, Departments of Animal Husbandry became Departments of Animal Science, 
defined not as care, but as ―the application of industrial methods to the production of 
animals‖ to increase efficiency and productivity.  With ―technological sanders‖ – hormones, 
vaccines, antibiotics, air-handling systems, mechanization – we could force square pegs into 
round holes, and place animals into environments where they suffered in ways irrelevant to 
productivity. If a nineteenth century agriculturalist had tried to put 100,000 egg-laying hens 
in cages in a building, they all would have died of disease in a month; today such systems 
dominate. 
 The new approach to animal agriculture was not the result of cruelty, bad character or 
even insensitivity.  It developed rather out of perfectly decent, prima facie plausible motives 
that were a product of dramatic significant historical and social upheavals that occurred after 
World War II.  At that point in time, agricultural scientists and government officials became 
extremely concerned about supplying the public with cheap and plentiful food for a variety of 
reasons.  In the first place, after the Dust Bowl and the Great Depression, many people in the 
U.S. had soured on farming.  Second, reasonable predictions of urban and suburban 
encroachment on agricultural land were being made, with a resultant diminution of land for 
food production.  Third, many farm people had been sent to both foreign and domestic urban 
centers during the war, thereby creating a reluctance to return to rural areas that lacked 
excitement; recall the song of the 40‘s ―How are you gonna keep ‗em down on the farm now 
that they‘ve seen Paree?‖  Fourth, having experienced the spectre of literal starvation during 
the Great Depression, the American consumer was, for the first time in history, fearful of an 
insufficient food supply.  Fifth, projection of major population increases further fueled 
concern. 
 When the above considerations of loss of land and diminution of agricultural labor 
are coupled with the rapid development of a variety of technological modalities relevant to 
agriculture during and after World Was II and with the burgeoning belief in technologically-
based economics of scale, it was probably inevitable that animal agriculture would be come 
subject to industrialization.  This was a major departure from traditional agriculture and a 
fundamental change in agricultural core values – industrial values of efficiency and 
productivity replaced and eclipsed the traditional values of ―way of life‖ and husbandry. 
   One of my colleagues, a cow-calf cattle specialist, says that the worst thing that ever 
happened to his department is betokened by the name change from Animal Husbandry to 
Animal Science.  No husbandry person would ever dream of feeding sheep meal, poultry 
waste, or cement dust to cattle, but such ―innovations‖ are entailed by an industrial/efficiency 
mind-set. 
 In addition, in the mid-twentieth century there arose large scale use of animals in 
research and testing for toxicity. This too was an unprecedented large-scale use of animals, 
lacking the fairness of husbandry agriculture.   
A moment‘s reflection on the development of large-scale animal research and high-
technology agriculture elucidates why these innovations have led to the demand for a new 
 ethic for animals in society.  In a nutshell, these new developments represent a radically 
different playing field of animal use from the one that characterized most of human history; 
in the modern world of agriculture and animal research, the traditional anti-cruelty ethic 
grows increasingly less applicable.  A thought experiment makes this clear.  Imagine a pie 
chart that represents all the suffering that animals experience at human hands today.  What 
percentage of that suffering is a result of intentional cruelty of the sort condemned by the 
anticruelty ethic and laws?   When I ask my audiences this question—whether scientists, 
agriculturalists, animal advocates, or members of the general public—I always get the same 
response:  only a fraction of 1 percent.  Few people have ever witnessed overt, intentional 
cruelty, which is thankfully rare. 
 On the other hand, people realize that biomedical and other scientific research, 
toxicological safety testing, uses of animals in teaching, pharmaceutical product extraction 
from animals, and so on all produce far more suffering than does overt cruelty.  This 
suffering comes from creating disease, burns, trauma, fractures, and the like in animals in 
order to study them; producing pain, fear, learned helplessness, aggression, and other states 
for research; poisoning animals to study toxicity; and performing surgery on animals to 
develop new operative procedures.  In addition, suffering is engendered by the unnatural 
housing of research animals.   
 Now it is clear that farmers and researchers are not intentionally cruel—they are 
motivated by plausible and decent intentions: to cure disease, advance knowledge, ensure 
product safety, provide cheap and plentiful food.  Nonetheless, they may inflict great 
amounts of suffering on the animals they use.   Furthermore, the traditional ethic of anti-
cruelty and the laws expressing it had no vocabulary for labeling such suffering, since 
researchers were not maliciously intending to hurt the animals.  Indeed, this is eloquently 
marked by the fact that the cruelty laws exempt animal use in science and standard 
agricultural practices from their purview.  Therefore, a new set of concepts beyond cruelty 
and kindness was needed to discuss the issues associated with burgeoning research animal 
use and industrial agriculture. 
  Society eventually became aware that new kinds of suffering were engendered 
by modern agriculture.  Once again, producers could not be categorized as cruel, yet they 
were responsible for new types of animal suffering on at least four fronts: 
1. Production diseases arise from the new ways the animals are produced.  For 
example, liver abscesses in cattle are a function of certain animals‘ responses to the 
high-concentrate, low-roughage diet that characterizes feedlot production.  Although 
a certain percentage of the animals get sick and die, the overall economic efficiency 
of feedlots is maximized by the provision of such a diet.  The ideas of a method of 
production creating diseases that were ―acceptable‖ would be anathema to a 
husbandry agriculturalist. 
2. The huge scale of industrialized agricultural operations and the small profit 
margin per animal militate against the sort of individual attention that typified much 
of traditional agriculture.    
3. Another new source of suffering in industrialized agriculture results from 
physical and psychological deprivation for animals in confinement: lack of space, 
lack of companionship for social animals, inability to move freely, boredom, austerity 
of environments, and so on.  Since the animals evolved for adaptation to extensive 
environments but are now placed in truncated environments, such deprivation is 
inevitable.   
 4. In confinement systems, workers may not be ―animal smart‖; the 
―intelligence,‖ such as it is, is in the mechanized system.  Instead of husbandmen, 
workers in swine factories are minimum wage, often animal-ignorant labor.  So there 
is often no empathy with, or concern for, the animals. 
 These sources of suffering, like the ones in research, are again not captured by the 
vocabulary of cruelty, nor are they proscribed or even acknowledged by the laws based on 
the anti-cruelty ethic.  Furthermore, they typically do not arise under traditional agriculture 
and its ethic of husbandry. 
  A few years ago, I experienced some sharply contracting incidents which 
dramatically highlight the moral difference between intensive and extensive agriculture.  
That particular year, Colorado cattle ranchers, paradigmatic exemplars of husbandry, were 
afflicted by a significant amount of scours.  Over two months, I talked to a half dozen 
rancher friends of mine.  Every single one had experienced trouble with scours, and every 
one had spent more on treating the disease than was economically justified by the calves‘ 
monetary value.  When I asked these men why they were being what an economist would 
term ―economically irrational,‖ they were quite adamant in their response: ―It‘s part of my 
bargain with the animal; part of caring for them,‖ one of them said. 
It is, of course, the same ethical outlook that leads ranch wives to sit up all night with 
sick marginal calves, sometimes for days in a row.  If the issues were strictly economic, these 
people would hardly be valuing their time at 50¢ per hour—including their sleep time! 
 Now in contrast to these uplifting moral attitudes, consider the following: One of my 
animal scientist colleagues related to me that his son-in-law was an employee in a large, total 
confinement swine operation.  As a young man he had raised and shown pigs, keeping them 
semi-extensively.  One day he detected a disease among the feeder pigs in the confinement 
facility where he works, which necessitated killing them with a blow to the head, since this 
operation did not treat individual animals, their profit margin being allegedly too low.  Out of 
his long established husbandry ethic, he came in on his own time with his own medicine to 
treat the animals.  He cured them!  Management‘s response was to fire him on the spot for 
violating company policy!  He kept his job and escaped with a reprimand only when he was 
able to prove that he had expended his own—not the company‘s—resources.  He continued 
to work for them for a short time, but quit saying ―this ain‘t agriculture. The above-detailed 
contrasting incidents, better than anything else I know, eloquently illustrate the large gap 
between the ethics of husbandry and industry.  (Many confinement operations are run by 
accountants, not by animal science or animal husbandry people.) 
  Given that the old anti-cruelty ethic did not apply to animal research or 
confinement agriculture, society needed new ethical concepts to express its concern about 
these new uses.  But ethical concepts do not arise ex nihilo. 
  Plato taught us a very valuable lesson about effecting ethical change.  If one 
wishes to change another person‘s – or society‘s – ethical beliefs, it is much better to remind 
than to teach or, in my martial arts metaphor, to use judo rather than sumo.  In other words, if 
you and I disagree ethically on some matter, it is far better for me to show you that what I am 
trying to convince you of is already implicit – albeit unnoticed – in what you already believe.  
Similarly, we cannot force others to believe as we do (sumo); we can, however, show them 
that their own assumptions, if thought through, lead to a conclusion different from what they 
currently entertain (judo).  These points are well-exemplified in 20
th
 century U.S. history.  
Prohibition was sumo, not judo – an attempt to forcefully impose a new ethic about drinking 
on the majority by the minority.  As such, it was doomed to fail, and in fact people drank 
 more during Prohibition.  Contrast this with Lyndon Johnson‘s civil rights legislation.  As 
himself a Southerner, Johnson realized that even Southerners would acquiesce to the 
following two propositions: 
 All humans should be treated equally,  
and black people were human—they just had never bothered to draw the relevant 
conclusion. 
 If Johnson had been wrong about this point, if ―writing this large‖ in the law had not 
―reminded‖ people, civil rights would have been as ineffective as Prohibition! 
 So society was faced with the need for new moral categories and laws that reflect 
those categories in order to deal with animal use in science and agriculture and to limit the 
animal suffering with which it is increasingly concerned.  At the same time, recall that 
western society has one through almost fifty years of extending its moral categories for 
humans to people who were morally ignored or invisible --- women, minorities, the 
handicapped, children, citizens of the third world.  As we noted earlier, new and viable ethics 
do not emerge ex nihilo.  So a plausible and obvious move is for society to continue in its 
tendency and attempt to extend the moral machinery it has developed for dealing with 
people, appropriately modified, to animals.  And this is precisely what has occurred.  Society 
has taken elements of the moral categories it uses for assessing the treatment of people and is 
in the process of modifying these concepts to make them appropriate for dealing with new 
issues in the treatment of animals, especially their use in science and confinement 
agriculture. 
What aspect of our ethic for people is being so extended?  One that is, in fact, quite 
applicable to animal use, is the fundamental problem of weighing the interests of the 
individual against those of the general welfare.  Different societies have provided different 
answers to this problem.  Totalitarian societies opt to devote little concern to the individual, 
favoring instead the state, or whatever their version of the general welfare may be.  At the 
other extreme, anarchical groups such as communes give primacy to the individual and very 
little concern to the group – hence they tend to enjoy only transient existence.  In our society, 
however, a balance is struck.  Although most of our decisions are made to the benefit of the 
general welfare, fences are built around individuals to protect their fundamental interests 
from being sacrificed to the majority.  Thus we protect individuals from being silenced even 
if the majority disapproves of what they say; we protect individuals from having their 
property seized without recompense even if such seizure benefits the general welfare; we 
protect individuals from torture even if they have planted a bomb in an elementary school 
and refuse to divulge its location.  We protect those interests of the individual that we 
consider essential to being human, to human nature, from being submerged, even by the 
common good.  Those moral/legal fences that so protect the individual human are called 
rights and are based on plausible assumptions regarding what is essential to being human. 
 It is this notion to which society in general is looking in order to generate the new 
moral notions necessary to talk about the treatment of animals in today‘s world, where 
cruelty is not the major problem but where such laudable, general human welfare goals as 
efficiency, productivity, knowledge, medical progress, and product safety are responsible for 
the vast majority of animal suffering.  People in society are seeking to ―build fences‖ around 
animals to protect the animals and their interests and natures from being totally submerged 
for the sake of the general welfare, and are trying to accomplish this goal by going to the 
legislature.  In husbandry, this occurred automatically; in industrialized agriculture, where it 
is no longer automatic, people wish to see it legislated. 
 Animals have natures of their own  and interests that flow from these natures, and the 
thwarting of these interests matters to animals as much as the thwarting of speech matters to 
humans.  The agenda is  preserving the common-sense insight that ―fish gotta swim and birds 
gotta fly,‖ and suffer if they don‘t. 
This new ethic is conservative, not radical, harking back to the animal use that 
necessitated and thus entailed respect for the animals‘ natures.  It is based on the insight that 
what we do to animals matters to them, just as what we do to humans matters to them, and 
that consequently we should respect that mattering in our treatment of use of animals as we 
do in our treatment and use of humans.  And since respect for animal nature is no longer 
automatic as it was in traditional husbandry agriculture, society is demanding that it be 
encoded in law. 
With regards to animal agriculture, the pastoral images of animals grazing on pasture 
and moving freely are iconic.  As the 23
rd
 Psalm indicates, people who consume animals 
wish to see the animals live decent lives, not lives of pain, distress and frustration.  It is for 
this reason in part that industrial agriculture conceals the reality of its practices from a naïve 
public – witness Perdue‘s advertisements about raising ―happy chickens‖, or the California 
―happy cow‖ ads.  As ordinary people discover the truth, they are shocked.  
Just as our use of people is constrained by respect for the basic elements of human 
nature, people wish to see a similar notion applied to animals.  Animals, too, have natures, 
what I call telos following Aristotle – the ―pigness of the pig‖, the ―cowness of a cow‖. Pigs 
are ―designed‖ to move about on soft loam, not to be in gestation crates.  If this no longer 
occurs naturally, as it did in husbandry, people wish to see it legislated.  This is the 
mainstream sense of ―animal rights‖. 
As property, strictly speaking, animals cannot have legal rights.  But a functional equivalent 
to rights can be achieved by limiting property rights.  When I and others drafted the U.S. 
federal laws for laboratory animals, we did not deny that research animals were the property 
of researchers.  We merely placed limits on their use of their property.   Similarly, our law 
states that if one hurts an animal in research, one must control pain and distress.  Thus 
research animals can be said to have the right to have their pain controlled.   
In the case of farm animals, people wish to see their basic needs and nature, teloi, 
respected in the systems that they are raised.  Since this no longer occurs naturally as it did in 
husbandry, it must be imposed by legislation or regulation.  A Gallup poll conducted in 2003 
shows that 75% of the public wants legislated guarantees of farm animal welfare.  This is 
what I call ―animal rights as a mainstream phenomenon‖.  Legal codification of rules of 
animal care respecting animal telos is thus the form animal welfare takes where husbandry 
has been abandoned. 
Thus, in today‘s world, the ethical component of animal welfare prescribes that the 
way we raise and use animals must embody respect and provision for their psychological 
needs and natures.  It is therefore essential that industrial agriculture phase out those systems 
which cause animal suffering by violating animals‘ natures and replace them with systems 
respecting their natures. 
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